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Termination of the Duty of an
Insurance Carrier to Defend: Did the
California Supreme Court send the
wrong Signal?
An insurance carrier' has a contractual duty to indemnify' an insured
for losses covered by the insurance policy. 3 Under most policies of
liability insurance,' this duty is accompanied by a correlative duty
of the insurance carrier to defend the insured against all actions
brought against the insured that arise out of the circumstances covered
by the insurance policy.5 The duty to defend includes the duty to
provide a defense and the duty to pay defense costs. Many insureds
are unaware that a duty to defend is included in their insurance
coverage.6 Although most insureds consider the duty of indemnification
far more important than the duty of the insurance carrier to defend
a potential lawsuit,' the obligation to defend is growing more impor-
tant. The increasing recognition of the duty to defend is in part due
to the escalating cost of litigation' and the increase in the amount
of awards. 9
Many courts and commentators have evaluated the general principles
of the duty to defend.' 0 The issue of when the duty to defend termi-
nates, however, has not been the subject of extensive review." The
1. The person who undertakes to indemnify another by insurance is the insurer or in-
surance carrier, and the person indemnified is the insured. CAL. INS. CODE §23.
2. CAL. CIV. CODE §2772 (definition of indemnity).
3. See R. Keeton, Basic Text on Insurance Law §3, at 88-170 (1971) (explaining the prin-
ciple of indemnity).
4. CAL. INS. CODE §108 provides: "Liability insurance includes . .. [i]nsurance against
loss resulting from liability for injury, fatal or nonfatal, suffered by any natural person, or
resulting from liability for damage to property, or property interests of others. . . ."Id.
5. See Keeton, supra note 3, §7.6 at 462; P. Magarick, Excess Liability: Duties and Respon-
sibilities of the Insurer, §§1-7 at 3-128 (1982) (rights and duties of an insurance carrier to defend);
Revere & Chapman, Insurer's Duty to Defend, 13 PAC. L.J. 889, 892-900 (1982); King, Zeavin
& Snyder, The Insurer's Duty to Defend, 6 Civ. LiTiGATON REP. (California Continuing Educa-
tion of the Bar) 173, 173-76 (1984).
6. King, Zeavin & Snyder, supra note 5, at 174.
7. Id.
8. Id. With the insurance carrier paying the defense costs, the economic obstacles to defend-
ing an action vigorously vanish. Id.
9. German & Gallagher, Allocation of Duties of Defense Between Carriers Providing
Coverage to the Same Insured, 47 INs. COUNSEL J. 224, 224 (1980).
10. See infra notes 64-106 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 118-71 and accompanying text; but see German & Gallagher, supra
note 9, at 245.
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issue of when the duty to defend terminates can be illustrated by refer-
ring to an Illinois case, Denham v. LaSalle-Madison Hotel Company.12
In 1946, the LaSalle-Madison Hotel Company carried $10,000 worth
of liability insurance for the damage to, or loss of, the property of
any guest or invitee of the hotel. 3 A fire occurred in which the prop-
erty of approximately 250 guests was damaged by fire, smoke, or
water.' " The insurance carrier indemnified the hotel for $10,000,
thereby exhausting the limits of the policy.' 5 This amount, however,
did not compensate all of the potential plaintiffs.'" Naturally, the un-
compensated parties subsequently attempted to be compensated for
their losses.' 7
The insurance carrier could not be required to pay beyond the policy
limits because the hotel insured against a limited amount of risk,
namely $10,000.1' Due to the fact that the policy limit was exhausted,
the insurance carrier was not required under the contract to pay any
additional money. Whether the insurance carrier still has a duty to
defend after payment of the policy amount, however, is unclear. 9
A split of authority exists among jurisdictions on the proper rule to
apply.20 Some courts have held that the insurance carrier may not
be absolved of the duty to defend by tendering the policy limits. 2'
Other courts, including the court in Denham,2 2 however, have held
that the insurance carrier does not have a duty to defend upon payment
of the policy limits. 3 In this comment, the author will analyze and
critique California law regarding the duty of an insurance carrier to
defend the insured after the insurance carrier has fulfilled the indem-
nification required under the policy." This author contends that the
12. 168 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 871 (1948).
13. Id. at 577.
14. Id. at 576.
15. Id. at 584.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 584; see also Keeton, supra note 3, at 2.
19. See Gavin, The Insurance Carrier's Obligation to Defend When Claims Against the
Insured Exceed the Policy Limits, 35 INs. COUNSEL J. 92, 94-106 (1968); Des-Champs, The
Obligation of the Insurer to Defend Under Casualty Insurance Policy Contracts, 26 INS. COUNSEL
J. 580, 580-84 (1959); Montgomery, The Effect of Exhausting Policy Limits on the Duty of
the Insurer To Defend, 1965 INs. L.J. 651, 651-60 (1965) (all discussing the issue of when
the duty to defend terminates).
20. Montgomery, supra note 19, at 652; G. COUCH ON INSURANCE (2d Rev. ed. 1982),
§51.53 at 506-07; J. APPLEmAN, INStmANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (Berdal ed. 1979), §4682 at
16-42; A. WnNDT, INSURANCE CLAM AND DISPUTES (1982), §4.30 at 160-61.
21. See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
22. Denham, 168 F.2d at 584.
23. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 127-71 and accompanying text.
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duty to defend must be linked to the duty to indemnify so that the
duty terminates upon payment to the insured of the policy limits. 25
To resolve the problem of when the duty to defend terminates, a
consideration of several aspects of basic insurance law is necessary.
An analysis of the specific language of the various insurance policies
first will be given. 26 This author then will discuss the many rules of
interpretation to which the language of the insurance policy is subject. 2
After an examination of the insurance policy, the procedure of the
duty to defend will be outlined.28 This author will demonstrate the
difficulties that an insurance carrier encounters in determining if the
duty to defend commences in a particular action.29 In California, an
insurance carrier is obligated to defend an insured from an action
if any alleged claim potentially is within the coverage of the policy.3"
The use of a reservation of rights agreement also will be explored.3"
A reservation of rights agreement enables an insurance carrier to defend
a third party action brought against the insured without admitting
to the insured liability for the underlying claim.3 2 The standard of
care that an insurance carrier must use when defending an insured
also will be explained." Additionally, an overview of "layered"
insurance coverage and the impact that layered insurance has on the
duty to defend will be given.3" Briefly, "layered" coverage describes
insurance in which an insured obtains several types of liability coverage
for the same risk, sometimes with different insurance carriers.35 An
examination of layered coverage is critical because California courts
have analyzed the termination of the duty to defend almost without
exception in layered coverage cases.36 The problem arises in this situa-
tion because the indemnification and defense duties of one insurance
carrier arguably exist only after the exhaustion of the duties of the
other insurance carrier.37
25. See infra notes 172-90 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 64-106 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 64-96 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 73-96 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
36. E.g., Signal Companies Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 3d 359, 362-71, 612 P.2d
889, 891-96, 165 Cal. Rptr. 799, 801-06 (1980); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters,
56 Cal. App. 3d 791, 793-807, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47, 48-57 (1976).
37. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
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After discussing principles of insurance law, this author will examine
California case law concerning the duty to defend in the indemnity
context. 8 California courts have not developed a clear rule to deter-
mine whether the duty to defend ends after indemnification. 9 Rather,
the courts have analyzed various factors, including the specific language
of the insurance policy, the relationship between the insurance carrier
and the insured, and the nature of the injury giving rise to the claim.4 0
The inconsistencies in the California approach to the problem of the
relation between the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify will
be highlighted." This author recommends that California courts should
declare the duty to defend linked to the duty to indemnify so that
the duty terminates upon payment to the insured of the policy limits. 42
Then, by applying principles of equitable subrogation, the effectiveness
of this proposal will be demonstrated in the context of layered in-
surance coverage.4 3 As a preliminary matter, however, a considera-
tion of the construction of insurance contracts is necessary.
CONSTRUCTION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS
Since the duty of an insurance carrier to defend the insured arises
out of the insurance contract, 44 the key to determining the extent of
the duty to defend lies in the interpretion of the wording of the
insurance contract.45 The basic rule in the intrepretation of insurance
contracts is that the policy should be given a plain and ordinary
meaning.46 Thus, if the contract language is clear, a court should not
give the language a strained construction that would impose upon
the insurance carrier a liability that the carrier has not assumed. 4
A duty to defend clause,48 therefore, can be limited expressly so
38. See infra notes 127-71 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 172-90 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 172-205 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 191-205 and accompanying text.
44. In California, the duty to defend may be implied by the court under special circum-
stances. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
45. Montgomery, supra note 19, at 652.
46. Giddings v. Industrial Indemnity Co., 112 Cal. App. 3d 213, 218, 169 Cal. Rptr. 278,
280 (1980).
47. Id. at 218, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 280-81.
48. The standard form liability policy, prior to a revision in 1955, contained an insurance
agreement set forth separately in the policy and headed "Defense, Settlement, Supplementary
Payments." See Montgomery, supra note 19, at 657. In the early history of liability insurance,
some policies clearly gave the carrier a three-way option of defending, settling, or paying the
insured the face amount. R. Keeton, supra note 3, §7.6 at 481. The 1966 and subsequent revisions
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that the duty to defend will end when the policy limits are exhausted.49
Both the language and interpretation of clauses that limit the duty
to defend generally are unclear, however, and thus do not necessarily
dictate the point at which the duty to defend ceases." With this point
in mind, some basic rules on the interpretation of insurance policies
can be explored.
Elementary insurance law requires that any ambiguity or uncertainty
in an insurance policy be resolved against the insurance carrier. 51 This
rule has arisen to help overcome the inherent inequality in bargaining
power between the insurance carrier, who drafts the policy, and the
insured, who typically accepts the terms of the policy without
alteration.5 2 Therefore, if a defense clause does not state expressly
that the duty of the insurance carrier to defend ends when the policy
limits are reached or if the clause is otherwise unclear on this point,
the uncertainty will be resolved against the insurance carrier.5 3 For
example, in an attempt to limit the duty to defend solely to the
indemnification limits, many liability policies provide that the duty
to defend will apply to "such insurance as afforded by the policy. ' ' 54
"Such insurance" is ambiguous because the language could refer to
the type of insurance or to the combination of the type and amount
of the insurance.55 In this situation, a court can construe "such
insurance" to refer to the type of insurance only, resolving the
ambiguity in favor of the insured, thus requiring the insurance carrier
to defend beyond the policy amounts. 6
Along with the certainty requirement, the insured is protected by
the doctrine of reasonable expectations. 5 This doctrine provides that
the reasonable expectations of the insured regarding the insurance
have tried to clarify the problem by incorporating the duty to defend into the insuring agreement
and by providing that the duty to defend ceases after the policy limits are exhausted either
by settlements or payment of the judgments. J. Appleman, supra note 20, §4682 at 29. Hence,
some language found in liability policies is: "as respects the insurance afforded by the other
terms of the policy,'' "with respects to such insurance as is afforded by this policy," or "as
to perils to which this insurance applies." Gavin, supra note 19, at 92.
49. A. Windt, supra note 20, at 161.
50. See infra notes 129-71 and accompanying text.
51. Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 437, 296 P.2d 801,
805 (1956); Continental Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 27, 32, 366 P.2d 455, 458,
17 Cal. Rptr. 12, 15 (1961).
52. King, Zeavin & Snyder, supra note 5, at 175.
53. A. Windt, supra note 20, at 161.
54. Id; see infra notes 129-48 and accompanying text (example of a California case).
55. A. Windt, supra note 20, at 161.
56. See id.
57. King, Zeavin & Snyder, supra note 5, at 176; R. Keeton, supra note 3, §6.3 at 351.
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policy will be honored even though study by the insured of the policy
provisions would have negated those expectations.5 8 The California
Supreme Court in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Company" expanded the
doctrine of reasonable expectations to include the duty to defend.60
Gray recognized that the insurance contract in question was entered
into by parties of unequal bargaining strength and was offered to
the insured on a "take it or leave it" basis.6' The insurance carrier
in Gray made two broad promises in the policy: (1) to pay all sums
that the insured became legally obligated to pay because of bodily
injury or property damage; and (2) to defend any suit against the
insured alleging bodily injury or property damage even if the allegations
of the suit were groundless, false, or fraudulent.62 Gray held that this
broad language of the defense provision may have led the insured
reasonably to expect that the insurance carrier would provide a defense
of all suits brought against the insured, despite a provision in the
policy excluding the duty to defend for intentional misconduct. 6
Thus, in addition to the familiar contract defenses, an insured is
protected by strict construction of the insurance policy against the
insurance carrier and the doctrine of reasonable expectations. Using
these concepts, a court may find that an insurance carrier has a duty
to defend the insured despite language in the insurance contract to
the contrary. Before discussing the extent of this duty to defend, a
brief analysis of the procedure involved in the duty to defend is
appropriate.
THE DUTY TO DEFEND
Since the insurance carrier ultimately may be liable for losses suffered
by the insured, the carrier has a strong economic interest in controlling
lawsuits brought against the insured.6 ' Thus, most liability insurance
policies provide that an insurance carrier has both the right and duty
to defend the insured.65 In most jurisdictions, however, if no contract
58. Keeton, supra note 3, §6.3 at 351.
59. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
60. Id. at 268-70, 419 P.2d at 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107-108.
61. Id. at 269, 419 P.2d at 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107; Revere & Chapman, supra note
5, at 893.
62. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 272-73, 419 P.2d at 173-74, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 109-10.
63. Id. at 272, 419 P.2d at 173, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 109; See King, Zeavin & Snyder, supra
note 5, at 176. The insurance policy in Gray did not cover intentional torts; see infra notes
77-96 and accompanying text.
64. King, Zeavin & Snyder, supra note 5, at 173.
65. A. Windt, supra note 20, at 101.
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to defend exists, no concomitant duty to defend arises. 66 But, in the
unlikely event the insurance policy is silent on the subject, the duty
to defend in California will arise by statute.67 California Civil Code
section 2778 provides that indemnity against liability embraces the
costs of defense against claims brought against the insured. 6 Hence,
if the parties are under a contract of indemnity,6 9 a statutory duty
arises requiring the insurance carrier to defend the insured.70
California courts will imply a duty to defend even though the duty
may be excluded expressly from the insurance policy.7 In 1976, the
California Court of Appeal for the Second District implied the duty
to defend in an insurance contract by invoking the reasonable expec-
tations doctrine. 7 The court found that because of the unclear language
in the contract concerning the duty to defend, the insured reasonably
expected that the insurance carrier would provide a defense. 73 Thus,
the court was willing to imply the duty to defend even though the
defense clause arguably excluded the duty. Since the duty to defend
is included or implied in nearly all liability contracts, the next issue
this author will consider is the nature of that duty. Initially, the ques-
tion of when the duty of defense arises will be considered.
In the landmark case of Gray v. Zurich Insurance Company, the
California Supreme Court examined the duty to defend and rejected
the rule adopted by many states.74 Under the rule applied by those
states, an insurance carrier is not required to defend actions that,
as alleged in the complaint, are not covered by the insurance policy. 7"
The Gray court, however, increased the burden on the insurance carrier
by holding that the insurance carrier is obligated to defend an action
if the claim alleged potentially is within the coverage of the insurance
policy. 76
66. Id. at 101 n.1.
67. CAL. CIv. CODE §2778(3)-(5); see King, Zeavin & Snyder, supra note 5, at 174.
68. CAL. CIV. CODE §2778(3)-(5). This code section, however, often has been overlooked
by practicing attorneys. King, Zeavin & Snyder, supra note 5, at 174.
69. The statutory duty exists only if an indemnity agreement gives rise to liability and
does not apply to a party that is held liable under noncontractual indemnity principles. See
Davis v. Air. Tech. Indus., Inc., 22 Cal. 3d 1, 6 n.6, 582 P.2d 1010, 1013 n.6, 148 Cal. Rptr.
419, 422 n.6 (1978).
70. King, Zeavin & Snyder, supra note 5, at 174.
71. E.g., Aetna, 56 Cal. App. 3d at 800, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 52-53.
72. Id. at 800, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
73. Id.
74. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 268-81, 419 P.2d at 171-79, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107-15; see Revere
& Chapman, supra note 5, at 892.
75. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 275, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
76. Id. at 275, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
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Gray involved an action by an insured against his insurance carrier
for failure to defend the insured from an assualt complaint.7" The
policy issued by the insurance carrier was a "Comprehensive Personal
Liability Endorsement" containing not only a defense clause but also
a clause excluding intentional tort coverage from the insurance
contract.78 The initial suit arose out of a fight between Gray, the
defendant, and Jones, the plaintiff. 7 Jones filed a complaint alleging
that Gray "willfully, maliciously, brutally and intentionally assaulted"
him.8" Gray notified his insurance carrier of the suit, stating that he
had acted in self-defense, and asked the insurance carrier to defend.8'
The insurance carrier refused, stating that the complaint alleged an
intentional tort, which was an action outside the coverage of the
policy.8 2 Gray then defended unsuccessfully on the theory of
self-defense.83
The court in Gray first noted that the insurance policy set forth
a duty to defend.8 " The court then found that the insurance carrier
had attempted to avoid the policy by employing unclear policy language
that exempted coverage for intentional torts. 85 Invoking the reasonable
expectation rule, the court found that the insured reasonably could
expect, and was legally entitled to, defense protection. 6 Gray held
that the insurance carrier must defend any suit in which a plaintiff
seeks damages potentially within coverage of the policy.87 The action
by Jones was such a suit because that action, although alleging damages
from intentionally inflicted injuries, potentially could be decided under
negligence theories and thus be within policy coverage."
The general rule to determine defense coverage under an insurance
policy, however, is that the specific allegations of the complaint
control.89 Hence, had the Gray court followed the majority rule, the
insurance carrier would have had no duty to defend because Jones'
77. Id. at 266, 419 P.2d at 169, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 105.





83. Id. Jones was awarded a judgment of $6,000 in actual damages. Id. The jury refused,
however, to award the requested punitive damages. Id.
84. Id. at 268, 419 P.2d at 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 275, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
88. Id. at 276, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
89. King, Zeavin & Snyder, supra note 5, at 175.
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complaint alleged an intentional act, which was not covered by the
contract. To allow the defense obligation of the insurance carrier to
be determined by the precise language of the pleading, the Gray court
claimed, would create an anomaly for the insured. 9 To avoid bringing
the insurance carrier into the litigation, the third party complainant
could have drafted a pleading to allege injury or damage not covered
by the insured's policy.9' For example, a third party may allege an
intentional tort, such as battery, knowing that if the true cause of
action, negligence, were pleaded, the insurance carrier will step in to
defend. 92 Considering the likely overstatement in the complaint and
the liberality of modern pleading, the Gray court held that the third
party hardly should be the "arbiter" of coverage under the policy. 93
Gray, therefore, held that the duty to defend may arise even though
the complaint against the insured alleges damages not within the policy
coverage. 94 Additionally, the Gray court syllogized that since no one
can determine at the outset of trial whether the third party suit falls
within the indemnification coverage of the policy, the issue of whether
the claim alleged is within the coverage of the policy, invoking the
duty to defend and indemnify, will not be resolved until after
adjudication of the action.95 Thus, if an insurance carrier finds that
the injury caused by the insured has the potential to fall within policy
coverage despite allegations in the complaint to the contrary, then
the insurance carrier is obliged to defend. 96 Having explored the circum-
stances that invoke the duty to defend, this author now will discuss
90. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d 276, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
91. Id. The third party may or may not desire the insurance carrier to be involved in
the litigation. See e.g., Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 904-05, 598 P.2d 854, 862,
157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 702 (1979) (Clark, J., dissenting). If the third party brings in the insurance
carrier, the third party brings in the "deep pockets." See id. On the other hand, if the third
party does not involve the carrier in the litigation, the third party is left to the insured's assets
and not the policy proceeds. See id. In Taylor, Judge Clark stated that when punitive damages
are awarded, the insurance carrier would be absolved of all liability. Id. Thus, plaintiff would
have a large award, but would be left with nobody to pay the award and hence would rarely
ask for punititve damages. Id.
92. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 276, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 276-77, 419 P.2d at 176-77, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13.
95. Id. at 271-72, 419 P.2d at 173, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 109; see Centennial Ins. Co. v. Applied
Health Care Systems, 710 F.2d 1288, 1291 (7th Cir. 1983).
96. See Mullen v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 163, 170, 140 Cal. Rptr. 605,
609 (1977) (the court examined whether the insurance carrier possessed sufficient factual infor-
mation to determine whether the duty to defend arose). A wrongful refusal to defend by an
insurance carrier automatically will subject the carrier to liability for both the costs of defense
and any adverse judgment the insured suffers, even when the judgment is rendered on a theory
not within coverage of the insurance policy. Cathay Mortuary (Wah Sang) v. United Pac. Ins.,
582 F. Supp. 650, 659-60 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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the reservation of rights agreement, a device used by insurance carriers
to limit their liability if the duty to defend has been invoked.
If the insurance carrier assumes the defense of an action against
the insured, the carrier is estopped from a defense of noncoverage
in any subsequent litigation by the insured against the insurance
carrier. 97 To prevent estoppel, the insurance carrier can accept the
defense of an action brought against the insured while reserving the
right to contest the indemnification issues.9" In California, because
the duty to defend is invoked upon the potential of liability,99 the
reservation of rights agreement often is used to prevent estoppel. 00
The use of a reservation of rights agreement coupled with the rule
in Gray, however, creates a potential for nonzealous defense by the
insurance carrier. Before Gray the insurance carrier only would have
to defend the insured from actions in which the insurance carrier had
a predictable interest.' 0 ' Under the Gray rule, and with the advent
of estoppel-preventing agreements, an insurance carrier may be required
to defend an action for which the insurance carrier ultimately will
not be liable. Hence, the possibility of a less than competent defense
by the insurance carrier is present. Courts have responded to this
dilemma by requiring a good faith defense by the insurance carrier.
Thus, in fulfilling the duty to defend, the insurance carrier is required
to use due care and good faith.' 2 If the insurance carrier fails to
97. See Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 648, 394 P.2d 571, 577, 39
Cal. Rptr. 731, 737 (1964). In California, the theory that, by defending a suit, an insurance
carrier waives the right to claim noncoverage rests upon the doctrine of estoppel. Val's Painting
& Drywall, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 576, 587, 126 Cal. Rptr. 267, 273 (1976).
Hence to prove a waiver of the right to claim noncoverage, the insured must show that the
insurance carrier either intentionally relinquished a known right or acted in a manner that caused
the insured reasonably to believe the carrier had relinquished the right, and that the insured
relied upon the conduct of the carrier to the detriment of the insured. Id.
98. King, Zeavin & Snyder, supra note 5, at 177.
99. Id.
100. E.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Richmond, 76 Cal. App. 3d 645, 143 Cal. Rptr. 75
(1977) (Richmond is a different case than the Aetna case discussed infra). In Richmond, for
example, the reservation of rights agreement stated:
This Company will provide a defense for you as per the terms of the insurance policy,
but this Company does not waive any of its Rights under the terms, conditions and
provisions of the insurance policy. Therefore, if a judgment is entered against you
for damages that are not covered under the policy this Company will not be respon-
sible for the judgment.
Id. at 649-50, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 79; G. Couch, supra note 20, §51.78 at 565-66.
101. Revere & Chapman, supra note 5, at 889-92 (discussion of substantive law before Gray).
102. J. Appleman, supra note 20, §46.87 at 179; see Palmer v. Financial Indem. Co., 215
Cal. App. 2d 419, 427-28, 30 Cal. Rptr. 204, 207-08 (1963); Pacific Indem. Group v. Dunton,
243 Cal. App. 2d 504, 509, 52 Cal. Rptr. 332, 335 (1966) (defense counsel owes sole allegiance
to the insured).
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meet this standard, the carrier will be liable to the insured for the
amount of the judgment in excess of the policy limits of the insured."0 3
When doubt exists whether the insured is covered under the insurance
policy, the defense counsel provided by the insurance carrier is in
an anomalous position because the defense counsel must protect the
interests of both the insurance carrier and the insured. Although fre-
quently the interests of the insured and the insurance carrier are the
same, this anamoly arises when the interests conflict. For example,
the insured may want the court to find the insured negligent, thereby
requiring indemnification by the insurance carrier. On the other hand,
the carrier may want the court to find the insured guilty of an inten-
tional tort, thereby excluding indemnification."' The defense counsel
usually will withdraw from representing one of the parties in the event
of conflicting interests of this type.'65
An overview of the procedural aspects of the duty to defend has
shown that the duty is contractual, although unique rules of construc-
tion apply. In California, the insurance carrier is obligated to defend
the insured from any action potentially within the coverage of the
insurance policy. The defense counsel involved in a situation embracing
interests of both the insured and the insurance carrier can use a reser-
vation of rights agreement to protect the future rights of the insurance
carrier. The defense counsel must use the utmost due care and good
faith in the defense of the insured.
The issue of when the duty to defend terminates now may be
analyzed. Most cases in California that have addressed whether the
duty to defend extends beyond indemnification involved "layered"
insurance coverage.'0 6 Thus, a review of the law concerning layered
insurance coverage is necessary..
THE DUTY TO DEFEND IN THE CONTEXT OF
LAYERED INSURANCE COVERAGE
Layered insurance coverage describes a situation in which an insured
obtains several kinds of liability coverage for the same risk, usually
at different rates.' 7 The underlying policy is called the "primary"
103. J. Appleman, supra note 20, §46.87 at 179.
104. Magarick, supra note 5, §3.01 at 45-46.
105. Id. §3.05 at 51.
106. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
107. See Transit Cas. Co. v. Spink Carp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 135, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360,
367 (1979).
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policy.' 8 In Denham, the hotel fire case discussed earlier,' 9 the $10,000
coverage would be the primary coverage. If, however, the hotel owners
wanted coverage beyond the $10,000 of primary coverage, they could
obtain an "excess" liability policy."10 Under an excess insurance policy,
the insurance carrier is not liable for any part of the loss that is covered
by the primary insurance carrier.' Rather, the excess carrier is liable
only for the amount of loss in excess of the coverage provided by
the other policy of insurance. A conflict between primary and excess
insurance carriers arises in the determination of which carrier will pay
for the costs of defending their mutual insured."' The problem typically
arises when the primary carrier is notified of a massive claim against
the insured that will be very expensive to defend and, if successful,
will exhaust the limits of the primary policy.'' 3
Several principles can be derived from California case law concerning
the allocation of duties to defend between primary and excess
insurers.'' Generally, the primary insurer has the primary duty to
defend and the duty of the excess insurer is dependent upon the extent
of the insured's claim." 5 Thus, if the damages prayed for in the claim
against the insured are less than the limits of the primary policy, and
the primary insurer undertakes the defense, the secondary insurer is
not required to defend."" If the claim exceeds the limits of the primary
policy, however, and only one insurer undertakes the defense, both
insurers will be liable for a share of the costs of defense based upon
the amount of the claim each is required to pay." 7
A brief examination of California law on the duty to defend by
multiple insurers of the same risk has been provided. The duty to
defend exists in nearly all liability policies and the approach of Califor-
nia courts obligates the insurance carrier to defend any action poten-
tially within the terms of the policy. The point at which this duty
108. G. Couch, supra note 20, §62.48 at 484.
109. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
110. 0. Couch, supra note 20, §62.46 at 484.
111. Id.
112. Conley, Relations Between Primary and Excess Insurance Carriers, 32 FED'NW OF INS.
COUNSEL Q. 123, 125 (1981).
113. Id.
114. See Am. Fid. Ins. Co. v. Emp. Mut. Cas. Co., 593 P.2d 14, 20-23 (Kansas 1979)
(review of California decisions discussing the division of the duty of defense by multiple in-
surers of the same risk).
115. See Aetna, 56 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 54; P. Magarick, supra note
5, §1.06 at 20- 21.
116. See Aetna, 56 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
117. Id. Each share is based upon the ratio of the amount paid by each insurance carrier
to the total amount paid by all carriers in the settlement of claims and the satisfaction of
judgments. Id. at 802-3, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
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of defense terminates, however, is not clear. Thus, this comment next
will explore the relevant case law concerning the duty to defend after
the indemnification limits of the liability policy have been reached.
TERMINATION OF THE DUTY TO DEFEND-APPLICABLE CASE LAW
A sharp division exists among jurisdictions over whether the duty
to defend terminates upon exhaustion of the indemnity limits of the
insurance policy."' On one hand, courts have held, without regard
to the language of the insurance policy, that the insurance carrier
cannot absolve itself of the duty to defend by paying amounts up
to the policy limits." 9 These courts have held that the duty to defend
is independent of the duty to pay. Generally, these courts disregard
a defense clause of a policy that attempts to extinguish the duty to
defend upon policy indemnification.' 20 The courts reason that, in situa-
tions in which the insured causes multiple injuries, the insurance carrier
will pay the coverage limits to terminate the entire defense obligation.,',
Therefore, to prevent an early escape by the insurance carrier, these
courts hold that the duty to defend is independent and continues after
exhaustion of the policy amounts.' 2
Other courts, however, hold that the duty to defend is dependent
upon the duty to pay.'23 These courts hold that the insurance carrier
does not have a duty to defend after the insurance carrier pays the
maximum amount required under the insurance contract."'2 According
to these courts, the primary obligation imposed on an insurer is to
indemnify the insured.'25 The other obligations of the insurance carrier
are designed only to implement the primary obligation of indemnifica-
tion.'2 6 Hence, the obligation of defense exists solely to better enable
an insurance carrier to indemnify the insured.
California courts have not followed either approach consistently.
A California appeals court first explored the issue in 1976, in Aetna
Casualty & Surety Company v. Certain Underwriters.'27 In 1980, the
118. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
119. A. Windt, supra note 20, at 160-61 n.238 (cases cited therein).
120. Id.
121. E.g., American Cas. Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322, 327 (4th Cir. 1951).
122. See id.
123. A. Windt, supra note 20, at 161 n.239 (cases cited therein).
124. Id. at 161.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 56 Cal. App. 3d at 798, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 51. The language in Communale v. Traders
& General Ins. Co., 321 P.2d 768, vacated 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958) cited by the
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California Supreme Court examined the issue in Signal Companies
v. Harbor Insurance Company.' 2 A close examination of both cases
is necessary to understand the approach California courts take on
the issue of whether the duty to defend is dependent upon the duty
to indemnify.
A. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Certain Underwriters
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Certain Underwriters, ap-
pellants, Harbor Insurance Company (Harbor), Certain Underwiters
at Lloyds of London (Lloyds), and the appellee, Aetna Insurance Com-
pany (Aetna), were insurers of Union Oil at the time of the Santa
Barbara oil spill.' 29 Aetna, the primary insurer,13 defended Union
Oil against claims resulting from the oil spill to the exhaustion of
the $50,000 limit of the primary policy. 3' Thus, although the damages
assessed against Union Oil exceeded the coverage provided by Aetna,
the entire defense cost was borne by Aetna, the primary insurer. Aetna
brought an action for equitable subrogation and declaratory relief
against the excess insurers, claiming that the duty of Aetna to defend
terminated at the exhaustion of the policy obligation.' 32 Aetna sought
a pro rata share of the defense costs from the excess insurance
carriers.33
The trial court in Aetna found that all the insurance companies
had a responsibility to furnish a defense for Union Oil, but that the
primary responsibility fell upon Aetna until the exhaustion of the policy
limits.'34 The trial court apportioned the costs of defense among the
insurers, using the ratio of the amount paid by each insurance carrier
appellant in Aetna did, however, declare that the duty to defend was separate from that to
pay irrespective of policy limits. The Communale decision was vacated by the opinion of the
California Supreme Court in Communale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328
P.2d 198 (1958). The court in Aetna did not consider the former opinion persuasive authority
to hold Aetna to the obligation sought by the appellants because the question of the duty
to defend was not reached in the later decision. Aetna, 56 Cal. App. 3d at 798 n.2, 129 Cal.
Rptr. at 51 n.2.
128. 27 Cal. 3d at 365, 612 P.2d at 892, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
129. Aetna, 56 Cal. App. 3d at 793, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
130. Aetna issued a Comprehensive Liability Policy to Union Oil that covered occurrences
from November 1, 1966. Id. The policy said that "With respect to such insurance as is afforded
by this policy, [it] shall: (a) defend any suit against the Insured alleging any such injury
.. even if such suit is groundless. . . ." Id. at 799, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
131. Id. at 793, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 797, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
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to the total amount paid by all carriers in the settlement of claims
and the satisfaction of judgments. 13 Harbor and Lloyds appealed on
the ground that, inter alia, Aetna, as the primary insurer, had an
obligation to defend Union Oil even after the limits of the insurance
policy that Union Oil had with Aetna had been reached.' 36 This argu-
ment, however, did not prevail in the appeals court.' 37
Appellants in Aetna argued that the language in the Aetna-Union
Oil liability contract was ambiguous and, therefore, the duty of Aetna
to defend extended beyond exhaustion of the policy limits.'38 Aetna
had promised to defend with respect to "[s]uch insurance as is afforded
by this policy." 139 The appellants argued that "such insurance" was
ambiguous and could refer either to the type and amount of the insur-
ance or only to the type of insurance. 4 Under the standard rule of
insurance policy construction, this ambiguity had to be interpreted
in favor of the insured. Thus, appellants argued, Aetna had a continu-
ing duty to defend claims arising from the one occurrence because
the duty to defend would be limited only by the type of coverage
and would continue regardless of the amount sought by the
claimants. '
The Second District Court of Appeal rejected this argument, employ-
ing numerous factors to evaluate the issue.' 2 The defense duties of
both the primary and excess carriers were interpreted by the court
in light of the several contracts of insurance, the relative position of
the insured and the insurance carriers, and the nature of the calamity
giving rise to the claims. ' 3 The court stated that "(n)o single rubric
nor any composite of selected rules of contract construction can alone
decide the unique matter at bench."' 44 The court required that all
carriers share in the costs of defending the insured."' Since the entire
defense burden would fall upon the primary carrier, the court reasoned
135. Id. As of the date of the judgment, the percentage allocation was 3.77 percent for
Aetna, 35.85 percent for Harbor, and 60.38 percent for Lloyds. Id.
136. Id. at 797, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
137. Id. at 804, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
138. Id. at 798-99, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 51-52.
139. Id. at 799, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 799, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 51-52.
142. Id. at 800, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
143. Id.
144. Id. The appellate court stated that if the duty to defend is separate from the duty
to indemnify, then the argument can be made with equal force against the appellants that
the duty of the excess carriers to defend does not depend upon the presence or absence of
any duty by the primary carrier to defend against excess claims. Id.
145. Id. at 803, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
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that a contrary result simply would offer a windfall to the excess
carrier who refused to defend. 46
The court in Aetna limited the holding to the facts presented.147
The Aetna holding required all insurance carriers to contribute toward
the loss because the duty of defense by the primary insurer ended
when the limits of the policy were exhausted. Although this holding
indicates a belief that the duty to defend is dependent upon the duty
to indemnify, the Aetna decision left room for an entirely different
holding. The duty to defend, stated the Aetna court, may be deemed
separate from the duty to indemnify, and, under facts different from
those involved in the Aetna case, may be broader than the duty to
indemnify.'48 The court, however, failed to provide guidance on what
circumstances would allow this expansion of the duty to defend. In
deciding a case factually similiar to Aetna, the California Supreme
Court relied upon Aetna to hold a primary insurer liable for the entire
defense burden.
B. Signal Companies v. Harbor Insurance Company
Signal Companies Inc. v. Harbor Insurance Company was an action
by a primary liability insurer against the excess insurer of an oil
company. 4 9 In Signal, the Supreme Court of California affirmed a
judgment relieving an excess carrier from any contribution for the
costs of defense incurred by the primary carrier in defending a mutual
insured.' 5 ° The court imposed the defense costs solely on the primary
carrier rather than apportioning the cost between the primary and
excess carriers as was done in Aetna.''
Signal arose after the collapse of a dam near Los Angeles.5 2 The
City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power filed actions'53 claiming $25 million in damages resulting from
the dam failure. 1 4 The complaints alleged that soil subsidence induced
146. Id.
147. Id. at 804, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 55. Aetna held that "under the facts at bench . . .
the primary carrier Aetna had no futher duty to provide a defense without the right of reimburs-
ment from the excess carriers." Id.
148. Id. at 804, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
149. Signal, 27 Cal. 3d at 362, 612 P.2d at 891, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 363, 612 P.2d at 891, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
153. Id. The City of Los Angeles and the Department of Water and Power filed actions
both on their own behalf and as subrogors of the individual claimants. Id.
154. Id.
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by subterranean oil well digging had weakened the dam structurally
and induced the failure.' The primary insurer provided for the entire
defense of Signal Companies, one of numerous oil companies named
as defendants.' 56 The litigation against all of the defendants was settled
for approximately 3,000,000 of which $35,000 was contributed on
behalf of Signal.' The primary insurer indemnified to the policy limits
of $25,000 and the excess insurer contributed $10,000.1'" The settlement
took place, however, after the primary insurer had incurred approx-
imately $95,000 in legal expenses in defense of Signal.'19 The primary
insurer instituted the action to recover a portion of the $95,000 from
the excess insurer. 60
The Signal court acknowledged the disagreement among authorities
regarding the issue of the duty to defend in relation to the duty to
indemnify.' 6' The court, however, did not address the issue directly.
According to the court, the issue was presented only peripherally since
the exhaustion of primary coverage and the settlement of all claims
occurred simultaneously.1 62 Under the terms of the excess insurance
policy, the excess carrier was obligated to pay defense costs incurred
prior to the commencement of trial only if the claim was settled for
a sum in excess of the primary limits, and only if the excess carrier
consented to a "continuation" of the action against Signal. 63 Since
the action was settled before trial, the court reasoned that no "con-





159. Id. at 364, 612 P.2d at 892, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 365, 612 P.2d at 892, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 364, 612 P.2d at 892, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 802. The undertaking of the excess
carrier was in the contract as follows:
2. Apportionment of Costs. Costs incurred by or on behalf of the Assured [Signal]
with the written consent of the Company [the excess carrier], and for which the Assured
is not covered by the Primary... Insurers, shall be apportioned as follows: (a) Should
any claim or claims become adjustable prior to the commencement of trial for not
more than the Primary... Limit(s), then no Costs shall be payable by the Company.
(b) Should, however, the amount for which the said claim or claims may be so ad-justable exceeds the Primary. . .Limit(s), then the Company, if it consents to the
proceedings continuing, shall contribute to the Costs incurred by or on behalf of
the Assured in the ratio that its proportion of the ultimate net loss as finally ad-
justed bears to the whole amount of such ultimate net loss.
Id. at 372, 612 P.2d at 897, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
164. Id. at 364, 612 P.2d at 892, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
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carrier was absolved of defense cost liability under the terms of the
excess carrier policy.'" Therefore, the excess carrier was not obligated
to pay any portion of the $95,000 in defense costs incurred by the
primary insurer.' 66
The court was able to distinguish Aetna because Aetna involved
the costs of defense when the primary insurance carrier clearly had
exhausted the primary limits and the action had continued., 67 In Signal,
however, the action was settled before the primary policy limits were
exhausted. The primary carrier in Signal argued that the principles
in Aetna should be applied to the facts before the court. 6 ' These
principles, if used, would require the excess carrier to participate in
the defense of the insured as soon as the excess carrier is notified
of a claim that might exceed primary insurance limits, even though
the primary insurance coverage has not yet been exhausted. 69 Relying
upon Aetna, the primary carrier in Signal contended that the excess
carrier had a coextensive duty to defend Signal because the potential
liability of the insured was in excess of the combined coverage afforded
by both insurance carriers. 7 ' The court in Signal rejected this applica-
tion of Aetna because the insurance policy of the excess carrier expli-
citly stated that liability of the excess carrier would not attach until
the primary coverage has been exhausted.' 7 '
In Aetna, the court prorated the defense costs between the primary
and excess carriers. Thus, the excess carrier was required to pay a
share of the defense costs after the exhaustion of the policy limits
of the primary carrier. In Signal, however, the court rejected the pro-
ration of the defense costs and, instead, placed the entire burden of
defense on the primary insurer. Thus, even though the claim was in
excess of the primary policy, the primary carrier had to shoulder the
entire defense burden. Both courts addressed the issue of whether an
insurance carrier, after paying the full policy amounts, can terminate
the obligation to defend the insured. With the holdings of Aetna and
Signal in mind, this author offers a recommendation to clarify and
solve this problem.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 365, 612 P.2d at 892, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
167. Id. at 366-67, 612 P.2d at 893-94, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 803-04.
168. Id. at 366, 612 P.2d at 893, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
169. Id. at 367, 612 P.2d at 894, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
170. Id. at 366, 612 P.2d at 893, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
171. Id. at 367, 612 P.2d at 894, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
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RECOMMENDATION-A LINKAGE BETWEEN THE DUTY TO DEFEND
AND THE DUTY TO INDEMNIFY
The foregoing analysis of California case law shows that a clear
rule regarding the duty to defend after exhaustion of insurance policy
limits is difficult to state. The decisions are clouded with issues in-
volving the relationship between primary and excess carriers and hence
are of minimal value as precedent. As previously noted, the terms
of an insurance contract, like most other contracts, can be varied
by the parties.' 72 Therefore, the proper "rule" will fluctuate accord-
ing to the specific language of the insurance policy. Most insurance
carriers, however, use similar language in their policies in an attempt
to link the duty to defend to the specific indemnification provisions
of the policy. 173 This author contends that in situations involving the
use of this typical policy language, a linkage should exist between
the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify. In other words, the
duty of the insurance carrier to defend should terminate upon payment
to the insured of policy limits.
Gray, Aetna, and Signal have suggested that the duty to defend
is "broader" than the duty to indemnify. 7 The meaning of the term
"broader", however, is not clear. The duty to defend is broader than
the duty to indemnify in one sense because the defense of the insured
from unjustified suits is one of the very purposes of liability
insurance. 7 Thus, the insurance carrier must defend the insured against
all actions brought against the insured that allege facts and circum-
stances covered by the policy even though such suits may be groundless,
false, or fraudulent. 76 The insurance carrier may have to defend
groundless suits, but, under the insurance policy, is required to compen-
sate the insured only for actual losses. Hence, the duty to defend
and the duty to indemnify are not always congruent because, although
the facts may indicate absence of liability, Gray requires the insurance
carrier to defend an action that potentially is within the coverage of
the policy. 77
172. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
173. Id.
174. See Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 275, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112; Aetna, 56 Cal.
App. 3d at 804, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 55; see also Signal, 27 Cal. 3d at 367, 612 P.2d at 894,
165 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
175. Magarick, supra note 5, §1.06 at 14-15.
176. See supra notes 74-96 and accompanying text.
177. See Magarick, supra note 5, §1.06 at 15. Many courts have recognized that the term
"broader" represents simply the requirement that the duty to defend is invoked upon the find-
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If the word "broader" as used in Gray, Aetna, and Signal means
that an insurance carrier has a duty to defend that continues after
exhaustion of the policy limits, the courts would be declaring that
the duty to defend is independent from the duty to pay.' 78 In that
case, California law would be consistent with many other jurisdic-
tions.' 79 The rationale provided by those jurisdictions, which
characterize the duty to defend as independent and severable, however,
is uncertain.'8 0 For example, one Arizona court declared that an insur-
ance contract imposed two separate and distinct obligations upon the
insurance carrier, namely, the duty to defend and the duty to
indemnify.' 8' Thus, because the duties were independent, the court
claimed the duty to defend extended beyond indemnification. Oddly
though, the defense and indemnity obligations were considered
severable because, according to the court, the insurance policy language
presented a strong statement of the duty to defend.'82 The language
of the defense clause, "as respects such insurance as is afforded by
the other terms of this policy,"' 83 however, would seem to indicate
an intent of the parties to limit the duty to defend only to the indem-
nity limits of the policy. Nevertheless, the court treated the duty to
defend independent from the duty to indemnify.
Jurisdictions finding that the duty to defend and the duty to indem-
nify are independent claim that if the duty to defend is dependent
on the duty to indemnify, then the insurance carrier would be able
to tender the policy amounts to escape a lengthy and costly defense
of the insured.' 84 This argument is unfounded. Courts that currently
hold the duties dependent do not allow the insurance carrier to escape
the duty to defend by paying the full amount of the policy coverage
to the court or to the insured.' 5 California courts simply would not
have to allow an early escape. As a rationale for prohibiting the early
ing of the potential of liability. See Val's Painting & Drywall, 53 Cal. App 3d 576, 582-85,
126 Cal. Rptr. 267, 270-72 (1975). In Val's Painting, the court, while citing Gray, held that
a claim that the insurance carrier may not be liable to indemnify the insured does not necessarily
mean an absence of the duty to defend, since the duty to defend is broader than the duty
to indemnify. Id. at 584, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
178. Magarick, supra note 5, §1.06 at 15.
179. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
180. Magarick, supra note 5, §1.05 at 12 (decisions that hold the duties independent "do
not appear to be based upon logic and seem uncertain in their conclusions").
181. Lawrence v. Burke, 431 P.2d 302, 308 (Ariz. 1967).
182. Id. at 309.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
185. See Sutton Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rolpp, 244 A.2d 186, 188 (N.H. 1966); Lumberman's
Mut. Cas. Co. v. McCarthy, 8 A.2d 750, 752 (N.H. 1939).
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escape of an insurance carrier, the courts can apply the duty of good
faith. As noted, when an insurance carrier defends an insured, the
carrier is held to a strict rule of good faith upon assuming that
responsibility.' Thus, when a defense counsel, although paid by the
insurance carrier, undertakes to represent the insured, the counsel owes
the insured an undeviating and single allegiance. '8 Early escape would
be antithetical to this duty of good faith and should be prevented.
Since the threat of insurance carriers to escape their full defense
commitment is controllable by the courts, an explanation of the advant-
age of the linkage can be given.
If the duty to defend is held to be dependent upon indemnifica-
tion, courts would be taking a more realistic view of the intent of
the contracting parties.' The intent of the parties should be the goal
in contract interpretation, especially regarding the duty to defend. Thus,
a critical factor in determining whether the duty to defend commences
is the reasonable expectations of both the insured and the insurance
carrier.'89 In the indemnity context, the insured is intending to decrease
the risk involved in a particular venture. Hence, the primary obligation
imposed upon the insurance carrier should be to pay for the legal
liability of the insured. Other obligations, like the duty to defend,
are dependent upon this primary obligation and designed to imple-
ment that obligation.' 90
The Aetna holding recognized the logic of the rule that the duty
to defend is dependent upon the duty to indemnify. The Aetna court
found that the primary insurer could be compensated by the excess
carrier for the defense costs if the claim exceeded the indemnification
limits of the primary policy. Thus, the court found that the duty to
defend was dependent upon the duty to indemnify and terminated
at the outer limits of indemnification. Having established that the
intent of the parties would be fulfilled better when the duty to defend
is dependent upon the duty to indemnify, this author next will examine
the Signal decision.
Signal Was a Bad Sign
In Signal, the California Supreme Court required the primary insurer
to pay the entire cost of defense even though the claim exceeded the
186. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
187. See Am. Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, 131 N.Y.S.2d 393, 401
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
188. Magarick, supra note 5, §1.05 at 12.
189. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
190. Magarick, supra note 5, §1.05 at 12.
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limits of the primary policy.' 9' The court stated that a settlement had
occured prior to any litigation for a claim that would have invoked
the duty to defend. 92 Thus, the duty of the excess insurer to defend
never commenced. 93 The excess carrier in Signal was required to in-
demnify for the portion of the loss over the limit of the primary policy,
but the excess carrier was not required to help pay the defense costs.
The defense costs borne by the primary insurer in Signal were $95,000,
far in excess of the $25,000 indemnified by the primary insurer and
the $10,000 indemnified by the excess insurer. Instead of holding the
primary insurer liable for the entire defense cost, the court should
have applied principles of equitable subrogation to allow the primary
insurer compensation pro rata from the excess carrier. 94 The doctrine
of equitable subrogation is broad enough to include every circumstance
in which one person, not acting as a volunteer or intruder, pays a
debt for which another primarily is liable, and that in equity and
good conscience should have been discharged by the latter.' Thus,
when the primary insurer settled in Signal for an amount greater than
the primary coverage, the primary carrier was paying for a defense,
which, in good conscience, partly should have been borne by the ex-
cess carrier.' 96 The subrogation of an insurance carrier should arise
by operation of law whenever one carrier provides a defense to the
insured that inures to the benefit of another carrier.' 97 This rule has
been applied a number of times to co-insurers of the same risk.' 98
No equitable, legal, or logical roadblocks exist to preclude the ap-
plication of equitable subrogation principles to the situation in Signal.'99
Courts applying the doctrine of equitable subrogation enable the
insured to receive the quality of defense that the insured deserves.2"'
191. See supra notes 149-71 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
194. See Signal, 27 Cal. 3d at 391, 612 P.2d at 908, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 818 (Staniforth,
J., dissenting).
195. Caito v. United California Bank, 20 Cal. 3d 694, 704, 576 P.2d 466, 471, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 751, 756 (1978).
196. Signal, 27 Cal. 3d at 390, 612 P.2d at 908, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 818 (Staniforth, J.,
dissenting).
197. G. Couch, supra note 20, §61.4 at 77-78; Signal, 27 Cal. 3d at 387, 612 P.2d at 906,
165 Cal. Rptr. at 816 (Staniforth, J., dissenting).
198. See Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co. v. Farmers' Ins. Group, 76 Cal. App. 3d 1031,
1044-45, 143 Cal. Rptr. 415, 423 (1978); American Surety Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 142 N.W.2d 304, 306 (Minn. 1966); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Foundation R.
Ins. Co., 431 P.2d 737, 741 (N.M. 1967).
199. Signal, 27 Cal. 3d at 391, 612 P.2d at 908, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 818 (Staniforth, J.,
dissenting).
200. Id. at 392, 612 P.2d at 909, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (Staniforth, J., dissenting).
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The duty to defend should encompass the same quality of defense
in cases that are within the primary limits as exists in cases in which
the claim exceeds the primary limits. 20' Normally, an insured is
guaranteed a quality defense because the interests of the insured and
the insurance carrier are compatible, since both the insurance carrier
and the insured want to minimize their liability.20 2 Under the rule
in Signal, however, the interests of the insurance carrier become
twisted. Since Signal held only the primary insurer liable for defense
costs, the vigorousness of the defense was limited to the financial
interests of the primary insurer, namely the first $25,000 of loss
incurred.20 3 In Signal, the stake of the primary insurer was only
$25,000, whereas the stake of both the primary and the excess carrier
combined greatly exceeded that amount.
In short, the duty to defend must be coupled with equitable subroga-
tion rights to achieve the reasonable expectations of the insured. The
primary carrier, enjoying a contractual limit on liability, cannot be
expected to provide as vigorous a defense as an excess carrier that
stands to lose much more than the primary insurer. 204 The reasonable
expectation of the insured is that the insured will not be subjected
to personal liability. This expectation is met when the insured receives
a quality defense that prevents a judgment against the insured that
would exceed the policy limits of the insured.20 5 Thus, by holding
the duties independent and refusing to utilize the well established prin-
ciple of equitable subrogation, Signal potentially left unfulfilled the
expectations of the insured.
CONCLUSION
Under most liability insurance policies, the insurance carrier has
a duty to defend the insured. This duty to defend usually arises from
a clause in the liability policy. This author has explored two areas
of contract construction that are unique to the insurance policy, namely,
strict construction of the policy against the insurance carrier and the
doctrine of reasonable expectations. Both of these protections indicate
201. Id.
202. Id. at 392-93, 612 P.2d at 909, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (Staniforth, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 393, 612 P.2d at 910, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 820 (Staniforth, J., dissenting).
204. Wint v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 257, 263, 507 P.2d 1383, 1387, 107 Cal. Rptr.
175, 179 (1973).
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a willingness of California courts to find a duty to defend even though
a strict reading of the insurance policy might dictate otherwise.
The duty to defend usually is limited by the contract, but the duty
may be expanded by the courts under special circumstances. In Califor-
nia, the insurance carrier is obligated to defend the insured against
any action if the claim alleged potentially is within the coverage of
the insurance policy. In a practical sense, this standard requires the
insurance carrier to go beyond the specific allegations in the complaint,
and, upon investigation, if the carrier discovers information that poten-
tially would give rise to liability under the policy, then the insurance
carrier is required to defend in the action. When an insurance carrier
determines that the action potentially falls within the defense clause
and accepts the defense of an action, the insurance carrier will be
estopped from arguing that the claim is outside the policy coverage
in a later trial. For this reason, if the insurance carrier is in doubt,
the insurance carrier will use a reservation of rights agreement, thereby
enabling the carrier to deny liability at a later date. The insurance
carrier is obligated to exercise due care and act in good faith in the
fulfillment of the duty to defend.
A split of authority exists among jurisdictions as to whether the
duty to defend terminates upon the exhaustion of the duty of indem-
nification. One view holds that the duty to defend is dependent upon
the duty to indemnify, while the other view treats the duties as in-
dependent. In California, the applicable rule is unclear. The Second
District Court of Appeal, in Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v.
Certain Underwriters, held that an excess insurer was required to con-
tribute to the defense of the insured upon exhaustion of the policy
limits of the primary insurer. Aetna, however, declared that the duty
to defend may be separate from the duty to indemnify and under
facts other than those involved in the Aetna case may extend beyond
the duty to indemnify. In Signal Companies v. Harbor Insurance Com-
pany, the California Supreme Court held a primary insurer completely
liable for the entire defense cost rather than apportion the cost be-
tween the primary and excess carriers as was compelled in Aetna.
Thus, although not specifically addressing the issue, Signal implied
that the duty of defense was independent from the duty to indemnify.
The better rule, as this author has urged, is that the duty to defend
is dependent upon the duty to indemnify. Hence, upon exhaustion
of the policy limits, absent a clause in the insurance policy to the
contrary, the duty to defend should terminate. Applying this rule along
1985 / Termination of the Duty to Defend
with principles of equitable subrogation to facts before the California
Supreme Court decision in Signal, this author has shown that the
primary insurer should have been compensated by the excess insurer
for providing the entire defense. The application of equitable subroga-
tion would fulfill the reasonable expectations of the insured.
Robert William Bollar
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